THE EQUIVALENCE OF THREE SOCIAL DECISION FUNCTIONS
by Ron ADELSMAN and Andrew WHINSTON ( 2 ) INTRODUCTION Recently several authors have proposed methods for determimng a social ordenng of a set of alternatives based on individual pairwise ordering of the set In each case the author had a different motivation for developing the particular function, but in ail cases it was shown that a relationship existed between majonty voting and the resulting social order. In this paper we show that all these formulations of the problem lead to exactly the same social ordenng of alternatives when the data on pairwise préférence are identical.
COMBINATORIAL OPTIMIZATION CRITERION
The Combinatorial Optimization criterion function of Bhn and Whinston [1] seeks to détermine a best ranking of actions such that the sum of vote proportions of each action over those lower ranking actions is maximized. 
is the desired criterion function-where
Here « P (i)pO)^o > ^ implies that the permutation^ has ranked action / over action /, and the dot product of two matrices of the same dimension is defined as Since p is a permutation wc can deiine the corresponding permutation matrix P p = \j> kj ] as _ f 1 if cij has \Q otherwi: rank k otherwise.
Nou \ p = P p AP' p , and ( \ t \ uin bc leunuen io emphasize its Quadratic Assignment nature
p This criterion function seeks to détermine the optimal assignment of actions to ranks, p, over all feasible m! permutations of the a t .
KEMENY FUNCTION
The Kemeny function seeks to find those permutation points, p'\ that maximize a dot product with the translated élection matrix E d . Hère a permutation point is defined as P p = P' p X P p where P p is the same as bef ore and
The translated élection matrix is defined to be in skew-symmetric form and is related to the previous élection matrix A by :
As Levenglick has demonstrated ( 1 ), the Kemeny function equivalently seeks to détermine the permutation point of minimum Euclidian distance from E d , thus maximizing the total amount of agreement bet ween P p and E d . Equivalently, one can view the problem from the position of choosing the optimal permutation matrix in the following criterion function
p As Levenglick has shown ( 2 ), (4) is extremely attractive in that it "is symmetrie, faithful, équitable. Condorçet, consistent and continuous for ail m > 2", and its consistent extension to the set of rationals on (2) space is the only function that satisfies all the above properties. THEOREM 
The criterion function (4)
is an equivalent représentation of (2) , and hence the Combinatorial Optimization criterion also has the above fairness properties.
Proof By équivalence is meant that if <}>( / > 1) > <l>[Pi) tnen H {P\) ^ H {Pz) and vice versa. Thus équivalence implies {p } = {/?*}; the same ranking of actions optimizes both criteria. The set notation is used since it is possible to have multiple social optima, which results when more than one permutation satisfies (2) and (4). To establish the équivalence we shall introducé the column vector of m ones labelled e. Furthermore, define Conditions (3) and (5) together imply
Similarly, X = Q -Q' and Z = Q + Q' imply
It is easily seen that
The dot product opération in (4) is invariant to any reordering T( ) of E d and P p X P p that preserves the matchup of their respective matrix entries.
That is
for all such valid T. T( ) can be considered to be the set of all possible permutations of the éléments of matrix ( ).
is a valid form-preserving manipulation. Now, (4), (6), (7), (8) and (9) combine to yield :
hence (4) and (2) 
Since Z sgn (E d ) = Z P p -0, (13) is equivalent to (14), using (6)
Thus, if sgn (E d )$F, we seek a permutation point that will entail a least cost for movmg from an ïntransitive majonty solution sgn (E d ) to a transitive social ordenng given by P p In a geometrie sense, sgn (E d ) and P p are vertices of a hypercube in (™) space, centered about the ongin, with edge length of two The problem is to choose the closest vertex to sgn (E d ) that belongs to F, where the measurement of distance is conditional upon A The followmg lemma gives necessary and sufficient conditions for determinmg whether or not sgn
If sgn (a (J ) = sgn (a jk ) / sgn (a lfc ) s then either a v = a jfe = + 1 or -1 In the former case, a l; = + 1 implies a tJ -a }l > 0, which m turn means that a x is preferred to a } by majority voting Thus, a tJ = a^ = +1 implies a x is preferred to a ; is preferred to a k , but a k is preferred to a t by majority voting, which is an ïntransitive ordenng Thus, In the latter case, the proof follows analogously
The above estabhshes sufficiency, necessity is now shown Assume that no such z, y, k exist that provide mtransitivity Since all higher order ïntran-sitivities ( 4 ) require an mtransitivity of tnplets [2] , there must exist a transitive ordermg of the a x provided by sgn (E d ), hence majority voting is transitive and optimal, and sgn {E d )e F ( 4 ) A /'* order mtransitivity is charactenzed as a n > a l2 a l2 > cf l3 a t 1 > a but a lt > a n In graph-theoretic terms, if one places a directed are from node i to / to indicate a t ranked over a p then sgn (E d )eF if and only if there are no directed cycles within the graph. Furthermore, if there are directed cycles, an attempt to elimmate them by determmg whether vertices of the hypercube adjacent to sgn (E d ) belong to F will incur a cost ol à tJ = 2{a lJ -a Jt ), where A tJ means that the adjacent vertex only differs in that component (z, /) is now -1 instead of + 1.
SET COVERING CRITERION
The optimization problem formulated by Merchant and Rao is as follows [6] : which establishes the équivalence since the sense of optimization is opposite for H and J.
DISCUSSION
Although the three criteria are all equivalent, each formulation of the social choice problem has unique characteristics. (2) and (4) are similar in that they are both primai approaches to the problem; both search over the feasible set of m ! permutation matrices, and at each stage of the problem, a feasible solution is known. In contrast, (15) is a dual approach; until the y t j are discovered, no feasible solution to the problem is known.
In (2) an optimal assignment of actions to ranks is determined, while in (4) a search for the optimal matching of a permutation point to a translated élec-tion matrix is undertaken. Thus, while both procedures are quadratic assignment problems of a set of "objects" to "positions", the procedures differ by reversing the meanings of objects and positions.
EXAMPLE
In order to illustrate the three approaches we consider the following example, originally proposed by Condorçet [3] 
